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IN SEARCH OF "LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM" 
Matthew J. Lindsay* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, legal scholars have been engaged in an ongo-
ing investigation into the origins and nature of "laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism." In its most general terms, "laissez-faire constitutionalism" 
refers to the notion that, beginning some time in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1905 
decision in Lochner v. New York,l state and federal courts hemmed in 
governmental intervention into the economy by imposing a host of 
new, or at least newly robust, constitutional conditions on the authority 
of the states to exercise their police powers. Scholars generally agree 
that this so-called "Lochner era" continued until 1937, when the New 
Deal Court finally relaxed constitutional scrutiny of police regulations, 
thus setting the state legislatures free. 2 
Two distinct, successive, and in some respects conflicting historical 
interpretations have dominated our understanding of Lochner-era po-
lice powers jurisprudence. The first, which is typically labeled the 
"progressive"3 view, first emerged as a contemporaneous critique of 
"laissez-faire constitutionalism" and became ascendant in the decades 
following the New Deal. According to progressive scholars, American 
judges steeped in laissez-faire economic theory, who identified with the 
nation's capitalist class and harbored contempt for any effort to redis-
tribute wealth or otherwise meddle with the private marketplace, 
* Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to Ajay Mehrotra, 
c.]. Peters, Kim Reilly, Garrett Epps, David Fontana, and Dan Sharfstein for their helpful 
comments. 
1 198 U.S. 45 (I 905) (striking down New York State law limiting the number of hours worked 
by bakers under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Morehead v. 
New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (I936) (striking down New York State minimum wage 
law, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525 (I923) (striking down federal law establishing minimum wages for women and child-
ren in the District of Columbia under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
2 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (I937) (upholding the constitutionality 
of a Washington State minimum wage law). See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 279-344 (I998); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT (I998); Forum, The Debate Over the Constitutional Revolution of I937, I IO AM. 
HIST. REV. I046 (2005); James A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Lib-
eral America, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. lIS (2006). 
3 The term "progressive" in this context refers to the legal dimension of the early twentieth-
century Progressive movement, rather than contemporary left-leaning political "progressives." 
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acted on their own economic and political biases to strike down legis-
lation that threatened to burden corporations or disturb the existing 
economic hierarchy. In order to mask this fit of legally unjustified, in-
tellectually dishonest judicial activism, the progressive interpretation 
runs, judges invented novel economic "rights" - most notably "sub-
stantive due process" and "liberty of contract" - that they engrafted 
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 
While the progressive interpretation continues to influence many 
commentators and judges,5 a subsequent generation of scholarship has 
undermined some of its key premises and conclusions. Since the 
1970s, legal historians and constitutional scholars have traced the main 
strands of Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence back to the Jack-
sonian aversion to "class" legislation,6 to the anti-slavery movement's 
adulation of individual economic liberty as a constitutive element of 
human freedom,? and to the nation's traditional social contract vision 
of political membership.s Taken together, these studies comprise a 
comprehensive historical revision of the progressive narrative that 
4 See, e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (I960); 
CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 393, 52o-21 (I943); 
BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (I942); Max Lerner, The Supreme 
Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668 (I933). The progressive interpretation drew 
heavily on contemporaneous criticism of Lochner-era jurisprudence, most notably Justice 
Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner itself, which accused the majority of striking down the chal-
lenged maximum hours law based on "an economic theory which a large part of the country does 
not entertain." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting). 
5 As Professor Gary Rowe writes, even today, decades after Lochner itself has been dead and 
buried, the progressive narrative 
haunts every judge's chambers and every constitutional law classroom. It gives force to 
the never-ending debate between judicial activism and judicial restraint. It generates 
the famed tension between judicial review and democracy. To Lochner is to sin, egre-
giously. Indeed, avoiding 'Lochner's error' remains the central obsession, the (oftentimes 
articulate) major premise, of contemporary constitutional law. 
Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 22I, 223 (I999) (foot-
note omitted). Professor Cass Sunstein has similarly noted the "received wisdom ... that Lochner 
was wrong because it involved 'judicial activism.'" Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (I987). This view of Lochner as an emblem of the "illegitimate intrusion 
by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of government," Sunstein 
observes, has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in a host of cases encouraging the virtues of 
"judicial deference to legislative enactments." I d. 
6 See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 19-60 (I993); Michael 
Les Benedict, Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (I985); Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge 
Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 577 (2002); Charles W. McCurdy, Jus-
tice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, I863-I897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (I975). 
7 See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 783. 
8 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-19IO, at 157-59, 164 (Stan-
ley N. Katz ed., 1993). 
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demonstrates - generally persuasively, in my view - that the Loch-
ner era is best understood not as a politically motivated binge of judi-
cial activism, but rather as a sincere and principled, if sometimes 
anachronistic, "effort to maintain one of the central distinctions in 
nineteenth-century constitutional law - the distinction between valid 
economic regulation" calculated to serve the general good and invalid 
"class" legislation designed to extend special privileges to a favored 
class of beneficiaries.9 
Professor Jed Shugerman's impressive recent article, Economic Cri-
sis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review,1O stakes 
out new interpretive territory within this revisionist project. Shuger-
man reveals how, in the r850s, the first generation of elected state 
judges transformed the Jacksonian antagonism toward "class" legisla-
tion into a countermajoritarian rationale for robust judicial review.u 
Because judicial review had long been defended as a means of protect-
ing "the people" against legislative overreaching, one might expect that 
elected judges who were dependent on "the people" for their continued 
tenure would embrace majoritarian rationales for voiding statutes 
passed by democratically elected legislatures. Yet they did exactly the 
opposite, driving what Shugerman pointedly calls a "counterintuitive 
turn to countermajoritarianism,"12 marked by increased protection of 
individual rights and an anti-populist conception of majority rule as a 
"threat to higher law."13 By uncovering this fascinating story, Shuger-
man provides a rare fresh perspective from which to reflect on what is 
perhaps the most venerable problematic in American constitutional 
theory - the supposed tension between democratic lawmaking and 
judicial review, also known as the "countermajoritarian difficulty."14 
Shugerman's article thus not only revises our understanding of the ori-
gins of judicial elections; it makes an important contribution to the 
vast literature on the history and politics of judicial review. 
9 GILLMAN, supra note 6, at ro. 
10 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judi-
cial Review, 123 HARV L. REV. I061 (20ro). 
11 [d. at 1I24-1125. 
12 [d. at 1I25. 
13 [d. at 1I24. 
14 The phrase is generally attributed to ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 16-18 (2d. ed. 1986). For an overview of the vast body of scholarly and judicial writing 
on the subject, see a series of articles by Barry Friedman: Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
333 (I998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Recon-
struction's Political Court, 91 GEO. LJ. I (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counterma-
.ioritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (200I); Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 9/I (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 1I2 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
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I find less compelling, however, Shugerman's further conclusion 
that the adoption of judicial elections in the r850s, and the increasing 
exercise of judicial review by the first generation of elected judges, 
helped to effect a "transition from the early republic's active industry-
building state to the laissez-faire constitutionalism that dominated the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century."15 This Response 
argues that Shugerman overstates both the extent to which the adop-
tion of judicial elections in the mid-nineteenth century was animated 
by an "an overall laissez-faire, anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideolo-
gy"16 and the extent to which the first generation of elected judges laid 
the doctrinal foundation for the so-called Lochner era several decades 
later. Jacksonian themes did indeed permeate Lochner-era police pow-
ers jurisprudence, but not as a countenance for laissez-faire. 
Part II takes issue with Shugerman's claim that the adoption of 
judicial elections in the r840s and r850s was driven by laissez-faire 
ideological commitments. Section II.A briefly surveys a substantial 
and growing body of historical scholarship demonstrating that laissez-
faire ideology never, in fact, characterized the actual practice of state 
governance at any time during the nineteenth century, and that during 
the period Shugerman labels laissez-faire states actually extended their 
regulatory reach into the economic marketplace as never before. Sec-
tion ILB raises some interpretive questions about Shugerman's conten-
tion that the state constitutional convention delegates who adopted 
judicial elections "embraced laissez-faire and the limited state."17 It 
proposes that much of the evidence on which Shugerman relies to 
demonstrate the connection between judicial elections and laissez-faire 
constitutionalism suggests that delegates were motivated not by a gen-
eral opposition to state interference in the economy, but rather by a 
Jacksonian aversion to the corruption, patronage, and special privilege 
that had plagued state legislatures in recent decades. Section II. C 
challenges Shugerman's argument that the decisions rendered by the 
first generation of elected judges in the r850s developed "substantive 
due process" - the "core weapon and doctrine of the Lochner era"18 
and a "pillar[] of laissez-faire constitutionalism for almost a century 
thereafter."19 It suggests that Shugerman misreads the mid-century 
uptick in judicial review in the service of "vested" property rights as 
both an expression of laissez-faire ideology and the doctrinal founda-
tion of the Lochner era. 
15 Shugerman, supra note II, at 1068. 
16 [d. at 1087. 
17 [d. at ro82. 
18 [d. at 1123. 
19 [d. at II2I. 
20IO] IN SEARCH OF "LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM" 59 
Part III argues that by overstating the doctrinal continuities be-
tween the mid-century "vested rights" decisions and the police powers 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era, Shugerman's account obscures the 
more immediate - and in my view indispensible - causes and con-
texts of the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. If we are to draw a line of historical causation 
from the mid-century "vested rights" decisions to the so-called "sub-
stantive due process" of the Lochner era, it must necessarily run 
through the watershed historical events of slave emancipation and the 
industrialization of labor, and the transformative constitutional 
changes set in motion by the Reconstruction Amendments. 
II. LAISSEZ-FAIRE IDEOLOGY AND STATE REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The first generation of elected judges did indeed act as the "more 
aggressive and populist judiciary"20 that the reformers had hoped for,21 
striking down many more state statutes than had their elected prede-
cessors and "establishing a more widespread practice and acceptance 
of judicial review in America."22 Perhaps most remarkably, as Shu-
german demonstrates, these judges justified their increasingly frequent 
practice of judicial review not as a "majoritarian institution, a means 
of protecting the people" against an "overreaching legislature,"23 as we 
might expect, but rather as a countermajoritarian defense of individual 
rights rooted in an anti-populist conception of majority rule as a 
"threat to higher law."24 Shugerman further argues, however, that in-
creased prevalence of, and changing rationale for, judicial review 
spurred, or at least abetted, a "shift from the active industry-building 
state to the laissez-faire state."25 That argument depends on two key 
factual premises: first, that there in fact was a shift from the "active" 
state to the "laissez-faire" state; and second, that judicial review mea-
20 [d. at IIIS. 
21 Shugerman's study poses a compelling challenge to leading historical accounts of the origins 
of elected state judiciaries, which cast the adoption of judicial elections as one element of a con-
certed Jacksonian program to "rein in the power of all officials to act independently of the 
people." [d. at ra64 n.I4 (quoting Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of the Scholarly Explanations 
for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL RIST. 190, 224 
(I993)). Shugerman demonstrates that for its advocates, the purpose of judicial elections was in-
stead "to bolster judicial power and to propel the courts toward voiding more statutes." [d. at 
ra68. Convention delegates and others concluded that judges elected directly by "the people" 
would be independent of the patronage and cronyism that plagued the judicial appointments 
process and thus better able to protect the rights of the people against legislatures that had been 
"disgraced as corrupt and incompetent." [d. at ra67. 
22 [d. at IIIS. 
23 [d. at 1I24. 
24 [d. 
25 [d. at ra70. 
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ningfully shaped the broad trajectory of state economic regulation dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first premise 
is at odds with a large and convincing body of historical scholarship. 
The second is partially accurate with respect to a particular subclass of 
police regulations - namely, laws regulating the terms of labor-
but does not describe a broad ideological project or a general approach 
to constitutional review that can properly be labeled "laissez-faire 
constitutionalism. " 
This Part begins by explaining that laissez-faire ideology did not 
shape the general practice of state governance at any time in the nine-
teenth century, and that during the period Shugerman labels laissez-
faire, the state actually extended its regulatory reach into the economic 
marketplace as never before. It then poses some interpretive chal-
lenges to Shugerman's contention that the adoption of judicial elec-
tions in the 1840S and 1850S was animated by "an overall laissez-faire, 
anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology."26 It proposes, in particular, 
that much of the evidence on which Shugerman relies to demonstrate 
the connection between judicial elections and laissez-faire constitution-
alism suggests that it was not a general opposition to state interference 
in the economy that motivated delegates, but rather a Jacksonian aver-
sion to the corruption, patronage, and special privilege that had 
plagued state legislatures in recent decades. Finally, it challenges 
Shugerman's conclusion that elected judges in the 1850S developed the 
doctrinal pillars of laissez-faire constitutionalism, and maintains that 
Shugerman misreads a mid-century expansion of judicial review in the 
service of "vested" property rights as both an expression of laissez-faire 
ideology and an early exposition of "substantive due process." 
A. The Myth of the Laissez-Faire State 
Shugerman states throughout the article that the upsurge in judi-
cial review in the 1850S helped to displace the "active industry-
building state" of the Jacksonian era with the "laissez-faire state" of 
the Lochner era.27 Although Shugerman is a bit elusive regarding the 
precise definition of the "laissez-faire state,"28 he suggests at several 
points that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were cha-
26 Id. at ra87. 
27 See id. at ra68, raio, 1123. 
28 In contrast to the depth, specificity, and conceptual subtlety with which Shugerman defines 
and explores the meaning of key concepts like "judicial independence" and "majoritarian" versus 
"countermajoritarian" justifications for judicial review, he does not define with much precision the 
article's other key concept - "laissez-faire," or more specifically, "laissez-faire constitutionalism." 
This permits Shugerman to classify as an expression of "laissez-faire ideology" a collection of evi-
dence involving the motives of the convention delegates, the meaning of the constitutions they 
produced, and the decisions rendered by the first generation of elected judges that probably does 
not warrant that label, at least as it is generally understood. 
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racterized by the "remov[al] [of] the state from intervention in the capi-
talism that the state had helped to build."29 Shugerman's "laissez-faire 
state" thus connotes something more than a kind of neo-Jacksonian 
opposition to special legislative privileges - something closer to the 
liberal "night watchman" state that is often associated with the Loch-
ner era. Shugerman's supposition that there was something properly 
termed a "laissez-faire state" is curious, in light of the burgeoning body 
of historical literature documenting precisely the opposite: that not-
withstanding a handful of "tabloid" judicial decisions striking down 
police regulations, state intervention in the economy not only contin-
ued, but accelerated during the period he labels "laissez-faire." 
Even as late-nineteenth-century "laissez-faireists" insisted that the 
state and federal governments cease interfering with freedom of trade 
and the natural laws of supply and demand, their protests failed to 
shape either public policy or constitutional law. Leading laissez-faire 
propagandists such as the sociologist William Graham Sumner and the 
English philosopher Herbert Spencer advocated that government re-
linquish virtually all influence over private economic ordering, includ-
ing protective tariffs, tax-funded subsidies for transportation develop-
ment, postal subsidies, land grants, and the regulation of wages and 
working conditions.30 If this was the laissez-faire agenda, it failed en-
tirely. As Professor Michael Les Benedict explained in a now-classic 
article, "[m]erely cataloging these positions ... indicates that most 
Americans found unpersuasive the argument that government could 
not improve upon the 'natural' laws of economy."31 Indeed, as the so-
called the "commonwealth historians" chronicled several decades ago, 
nineteenth-century state legislatures were deeply involved in the eco-
nomic development and regulation through the funding of public 
works projects, subsidization of "private" development projects, is-
suance of corporate charters, and the liberal exercise of the police 
power and the power of eminent domain.32 
29 Id. at 1I45. 
30 See Benedict, supra note 6, at 30I-02. 
31 Id. at 30 I. 
32 See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 
(rev. ed. 1969.); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA (I968). For helpful discussions of the 
"commonwealth" histories, see William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American 
State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth & Robert A. 
Kagan eds., 2002); and Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the "Com-
monwealth" Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (I972). On the 
nineteenth-century state's active involvement in economic regulation and development, see 
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (I956), which Benedict characterizes as "from beginning 
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State governments actively and consistently violated the fundamen-
tal tenets of laissez-faire, Benedict observes, as local authorities con-
tinued throughout the nineteenth century "to promote transportation 
development with tax abatements, debt guarantees, and public sub-
scription to stock issues," and to adopt "law after law promoting and 
subsidizing economic development, regulating business practices, em-
ployment conditions, and labor relations."33 The basic complexion of 
federal authority during the nineteenth century mirrored that of the 
states.34 Notwithstanding the mythology of the "Lochner era," and 
contrary to Shugerman's premise, state and federal intermeddling in 
"private" economic relationships actually proliferated in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. "A new forcefulness and re-
sourcefulness" infused discussions of the police power in the Lochner 
era, concludes a leading historian of the American state, "as Progres-
sives expanded the scale and scope of American legislative power."35 
Far from withdrawing its hand from capitalism, as Shugerman sug-
gests, the state thus extended its regulatory reach into the economic 
marketplace as never before. 
to end an implicit repudiation of the notion that Americans adhered to laissez-faire doctrines in 
the I800s." Benedict, supra note 6, at 297 n.I5; see also GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND 
REGULATION, I877-I9I6 (I965); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (I957); GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER 
LAWS (I971). 
33 Benedict, supra note 6, at 302. Benedict thus concludes that "[fJrom Missouri to Maine, 
from the beginning to the end of the nineteenth century, governments were deeply involved in 
lending, borrowing, building, and regulating." Id. at 302 (quoting Robert A. Lively, The American 
System: A Review Article, 29 Bus. HIST. REV. 8I, 86 (I955» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 The reality of federal governance throughout the nation's history, Professor William Novak 
writes, "bears not the slightest resemblance to ideas about American laissez-faire, voluntarism, or 
anti-statism." William J. Novak, The Myth of the "Weak" American State, I I3 AM. HIST. REV. 
752, 760 (2008); see also RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS (I995); Karen Orren, The 
Laws of Industrial Organizations, I87(}-I920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA 53I (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). Novak emphasizes the 
extensive historical "scale and scope" of the American state's "infrastructural power": 
From the founding of the first national governing institutions to the conquest of western 
lands; from the creation of a vast public infrastructure for the promotion of commerce to 
the construction of a powerful defense and military establishment; from the expansion of 
governmental powers of police, regulation, administration, and redistribution to the in-
vention of new ways of policing citizens, aliens, races, morals, and gender relations in 
the production of national culture, the infrastructural power of the American state seems 
at times boundless, even borderless, as American legal, corporate, economic, and cultural 
forms spread across the globe. It is this power - infrastructural power - that renders 
commentary about American state weakness or statelessness unintelligible. 
Novak, supra, at 763. Professor Brian Balogh's instructive recent book, A Government Out of 
Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (2009), similarly chron-
icles the myriad (if sometimes inconspicuous) ways in which federal authority penetrated Ameri-
can social life and shaped economic development throughout the nineteenth century. 
35 Novak, supra note 32, at 269. 
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B. Was Laissez-Faire in the Air? Some Interpretive Skepticism 
About New York's I846 Constitutional Convention 
Shugerman's argument that the adoption of judicial elections was 
animated by laissez-faire ideology rests largely on his analysis of New 
York's r846 constitutional convention. The "Barnburner" Democrats 
who dominated the convention and controlled its agenda, Shugerman 
claims, 
were liberal in the classical sense: they embraced laissez-faire and the lim-
ited state because they perceived that the wealthy and the party insid-
ers ... had captured state power and used the state for patronage, 'class 
legislation,' paper money, public debt, internal improvements, and redis-
tributing property to play favorites and tighten their grip on power.36 
The Barnburners forged an alliance at the convention with the Whigs, 
Shugerman explains, and together constitutionalized a host of provi-
sions designed to check legislative spending, prevent party patronage 
and corruption, and prohibit the granting of monopolies and other 
special privileges to individuals or corporations.37 "[T]hese impulses 
drove an overall laissez-faire, anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology 
with a broad populist base,"38 he concludes, thus helping to "lay the 
foundation for the laissez-faire constitutionalism that ascended after 
the Civil War."39 
Shugerman's own evidence, however, suggests that Barnburners 
and their allies can be characterized as "laissez-faire" only if one com-
prehends that term to encompass virtually any effort to constrain legis-
lative authority, regardless of the proposed scope of such constraints, 
or the ideology or political principle that animated them. Delegates 
appear to have been motivated not by a general opposition to govern-
ment involvement in the economy, but rather, as Shugerman acknowl-
edges, by their aversion to the corruption, patronage, and special privi-
lege that had plagued the legislative process in recent decades.40 
Indeed, the only direct evidence from the convention of a "laissez-faire, 
anti-regulation, anti-legislation ideology" comes not from Barnburner 
delegates, or even a Whig ally, but rather from a single renegade 
"Hunker"41 - a faction of conservative Democrats that, though domi-
nant in the mid-century New York Democratic Party (and thus closely 
36 Shugerman, supra note II, at I082. 
37 I d. at ro86-87. 
38 [d. at I087. 
39 [d. at 1I25. 
40 See id. at ro87-88. 
41 Shugerman quotes that delegate, Campbell White, as stating that the people of the state are 
"perfectly capable of taking care of themselves" and insisting that "all the interference of govern-
ment that is desired or wanted" is the enforcement of contracts. [d. at I087; see also id. n.I55. 
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associated with the corruption and patronage that suffused state gov-
ernance), constituted only a small minority of convention delegates.42 
Otherwise, Shugerman relies on Democratic sources from outside 
the convention to bolster his argument that convention delegates 
adopted judicial elections in the service of a laissez-faire agenda. The 
language quoted from a number of these supplementary sources, too, 
tends to suggest that the authors opposed government intervention in 
economic matters not out of principle, but because, again, they shared 
in the widespread Jacksonian critique of special legislative privileges. 
Shugerman's discussion of Samuel Medary's The New Constitution 
provides a case in point. In 1849, Shugerman explains, Medary, a 
"populist Democrat," published a series of pamphlets advocating a new 
Ohio state constitution that provided for greater judicial indepen-
dence. 43 Each issue of The New Constitution, Shugerman reports, 
"was filled with statements like the following: "'The people are gov-
erned too much." ... We have too much law. . .. Give us but few 
laws and a simple government, and the people will be prosperous, 
happy and contended,"'44 and finally, '''that Government is best which 
governs least. "'45 From this, Shugerman concludes that the pamphlets 
expressed an "anti-legislature and anti-regulation perspective" and 
suggests that The New Constitution could have been called "The Liber-
tarian Manifesto."46 Yet other evidence - evidence that Shu german 
quotes - resists this characterization. "Legislatures ... favored the 
tyranny of property in place of protecting the meritorious and poor," 
charged another article.47 "As it now is, we see legislatures spurning 
the good and wise [candidates], and bribing men to become hypocrites, 
and to rob us, as has been done in our public works, where knaves 
have made fortunes in a few years out of the tax-ridden, oppressed 
people."48 When we consider, as Shugerman notes, that The New Con-
stitution often reprinted "socialist, pro-labor" articles49 and that some 
42 See id. at I081-82. 
43 See id. at I099-IIOO. 
44 [d. at IIOO (omissions in original) (quoting Reform, NEW CONST., Nov. If, 1849, reprinted 
in SAMUEL MEDARY, THE NEW CONSTITUTION 40I, 405 (Columbus, Ohio, Samuel Medary 
1849) (reprinting an article from the Georgetown Standard». 
45 [d. at I IOO (quoting Biennial Sessions of the Legislature, NEW CONST., June 2, 1849, re-
printed in MEDARY, supra note 44, at 65, 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reprinting an 
article from the Piqua Enquirer». 
46 [d. at I099. 
47 [d. at lIOO-OI (quoting The New Constitution Assuming Shape, NEW CONST., Aug. 25, 
1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44, at 257, 268 (reprinting an article from the St. Clairs-
ville Gazette» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48 [d. at IIOI (alteration in original) (quoting The New Constitution Assuming Shape, NEW 
CONST., Aug. 25, 1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44, at 257, 268 (reprinting an article 
from the St. Clairsville Gazette» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49 [d. at I099. 
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of its populist writers favored protection for debtors against their cred-
itors (a classic bogeyman of nineteenth-century laissez-faireists) the 
motto on its masthead - "Power is always stealing from the many to 
the few"50 - takes on a different valence. Read through a populist 
Jacksonian lens, The New Constitution begins to look less like a "liber-
tarian manifesto" steeped in the ideology of laissez-faire than a critique 
of legislative favoritism for the wealthy at the expense of the poor that 
sometimes opportunistically adopted libertarian, laissez-faire rhetoric. 
My purpose here is not to nitpick Shugerman's analysis, but rather 
to highlight one particularly stark example of his over reading opposi-
tion to special legislative privileges as an embrace of laissez-faire. To 
my mind, Shugerman's evidence expresses less libertarian values than 
Jacksonian antagonism toward a more discrete species of "class legisla-
tion" that granted "special" privileges to the favored few. Populist 
Democrats sought to reign in the legislature not because they despised 
legislation per se, but because it had served as a vehicle of corruption 
and of favoritism toward the wealthy. As one leading historian con-
cluded after surveying the commonwealth histories and more recent 
scholarship, "[I]t is simply no longer intellectually justifiable to charac-
terize New York state policy circa r846 as 'laissez-faire' or 'negative 
government. '''51 
C. What "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism" Was Not 
Just as laissez-faire ideology never dictated the actual practice of 
state governance in the nineteenth century, neither did it shape judicial 
decisionmaking. As a generation of revisionist scholarship has persua-
sively demonstrated, the so-called "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked less by a 
general opposition to government involvement in the economic mar-
ketplace - the hallmark of the era's laissez-faireists - than a neo-
Jacksonian disapproval of "class" legislation that extended special 
privileges to the favored few. Further, even if we understand "laissez-
faire" to mean something narrower and more modest than "removing 
the state from intervention in ... capitalism,"52 I find unpersuasive 
Shugerman's contention that the countermajoritarian vested rights de-
cisions issued by elected judges in the r8sos laid the foundation of 
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. Although the mid-century 
decisions, with their aggressive use of judicial review in defense of 
50 [d. at IIOO (quoting NEW CONST., May 5, 1849, reprinted in MEDARY, supra note 44, 
at I, I). 
51 William J. Novak, The Not-Sa-Strange Birth of the Modern American State: A Comment on 
James A. Henretta's "Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America," 24 LAW 
& RIST. REV. 193, 197 (2006). 
52 Shugerman, supra note II, at 1I45. 
66 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. I23:55 
"vested rights," must be counted among the many historical precursors 
to the constitutional economic rights announced in later cases, they 
cannot properly be called the "major precedents"53 or "cause[s]"54 or 
"pillars of the Lochner era."55 
I. The Folklore of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism." - Neither 
state nor federal police power jurisprudence during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries can be accurately described as "laissez-
faire." As the U.S. Supreme Court explained at the height of the so-
called Lochner era, the police power was and remained expansive; it 
was "not confined ... to the suppression of what is offensive, disorder-
ly or unsanitary,"56 but extended as well to "regulations designed to 
promote the public convenience or the general prosperity."57 
And in fact, federal and state courts - including those that au-
thored such landmarks of "substantive due process" as Lochner, In re 
Jacobs58 and Godcharles v. Wigeman59 - upheld the vast majority of 
police regulations against constitutional challenge. While this observa-
tion is now a staple of modern revisionist scholarship, perhaps the 
most compelling evidence for it lies in two empirical studies published 
at the height of the Lochner era by the progressive legal historian 
Charles Warren.60 Warren examined the 560 decisions rendered be-
tween 1887 and 1911 in which the U.S. Supreme Court passed on the 
constitutionality of a state statute in order to test the prevailing pro-
gressive critique that a Court in the grip of an outmoded individualism 
had fallen out of step with "modern conditions," frustrating the ability 
of state legislatures to exercise police authority in the interest of the 
"general public welfare."61 Of those 560 cases involving "a social or 
economic question," Warren reported, the Court had struck down only 
three (including Lochner).62 "The actual record of the Court," he con-
cluded, "thus shows how little chance a litigant has of inducing the 
Court to restrict the police power of a State, or to overthrow State 
laws under the 'due process' clause; in other words, it shows the Court 
53 [d. at II2I. 
54 [d. at II23. 
55 [d. at II45. 
56 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 3II, 3I8 (I907) (rejecting due process challenge to Idaho law reg-
ulating the grazing of animals). 
57 [d. at 3I7. 
58 98 N.Y. 98 (I885). 
59 6 A. 354 (Pa. I886). 
60 Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power - The United States Supreme Court, 
I3 COLUM. L. REV. 667 (I9I3) [hereinafter Warren, A Bulwark]; Charles Warren, The Progres-
siveness of the United States Supreme Court, I3 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (I9I3) [hereinafter Warren, 
Progressiveness ]. 
61 Warren, A Bulwark, supra note 60, at 667; see also id. at 669. 
62 Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 60, at 295. 
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to be a bulwark to the State police power, not a destroyer."63 Modern 
scholars confirm Warren's assessment.64 The handful of iconic cases 
that are held up as emblems of laissez-faire constitutionalism, in other 
words, were the exception rather than the rule. 
Lochner-era courts did indeed discover novel constitutional eco-
nomic rights, as Shugerman suggests, and occasionally mounted robust 
(and even dramatic) defenses of those rights against overzealous legis-
latures. Shugerman misreads this judicial escalation of rights talk, 
however, as an expression of laissez-faire. Viewed within its broader 
historical trajectory, rather than through the narrow lens of a few ex-
ceptional cases, the constitutionalization of individual economic rights 
reflected not a far-reaching constraint on the regulatory authority of 
the states, but rather a complement to, and even a component of, the 
unprecedented expansion of that authority. As the historian William 
Novak puts it, "An expanded zone of private protection and individual 
autonomy" in the form of new constitutional protections "was quid pro 
quo for the radical extension of state power in this period."65 Far from 
impeding the development of the liberal, progressive state, with its 
myriad regulatory interventions into the industrial economy, the consti-
tutionalization of private economic rights constructively mediated be-
tween public power and individual autonomy, thus making the expan-
sion of state authority possible. 
2. "Vested Rights" and the Origins of "Substantive Due Pro-
cess." - Shugerman similarly over-interprets mid-century judges' in-
creasing willingness to protect vested property rights against legislative 
encroachment, coupled with the emerging countermajoritarian ratio-
nale for judicial review, as the doctrinal cornerstone of a full-blown 
"laissez-faire constitutionalism" that would prevail decades later. His 
discussion of the r856 case Wynehamer v. People66 is illustrative. In 
Wynehamer, the New York Court of Appeals struck down a criminal 
statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors.67 The court relied 
"on the innovative grounds of substantive due process,"68 Shugerman 
maintains, thus furnishing a "major precedent[]"69 and a "core weap-
on"70 of Lochner-era jurisprudence. While Wynehamer furnishes a ter-
63 [d. at 3IO. 
64 See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 4; Benedict, supra note 6, at 297,304; William E. For-
bath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, I870-I920, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 34, at 643,645; Novak, supra note 34, at 273; Orren, supra note 
34, at 532. 
65 Novak, supra note 32, at 265. 
66 13 N.Y. 378 (I856). 
67 See id. at 405-06. 
68 Shugerman, supra note II, at 1I26. 
69 [d. at I I 2 1. 
70 [d. at 1I23. 
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rific example of an early "anti-populist, countermajoritarian"71 theory 
of judicial review, however, it requires an interpretive stretch 
to read it as "establish[ing] ... one of the pillars of laissez-faire 
constitutionalism."72 
Wynehamer was decided by a divided court, which produced four 
separate opinions. The lead opinion - and the one on which Shuger-
man bases his interpretation - was written by the court's junior 
judge, George Comstock, who wrote only for himself. Judge Coms-
tock's opinion striking down the statute was indeed grounded in the 
New York Constitution's injunction that "no person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."73 Because New 
Yorkers held a vested property right in the liquor they possessed at the 
time of the statute's enactment, Judge Comstock concluded, the regu-
lation constituted an unlawful confiscation, and even "destruction," of 
propertyJ4 Despite Judge Comstock's invocation of the state's due 
process clause and vested property rights, the opinion actually reads 
less like a Lochner-era "substantive due process" decision than a his-
torically familiar defense of vested property rights.7s Indeed, the sta-
tute encroached unconstitutionally upon the plaintiff's property right 
in his liquor precisely because the legislature failed to distinguish be-
tween liquor that he already possessed at the time the statute was 
enacted and his right to sell liquor acquired in the future. Regulation 
of the latter, Judge Comstock insisted, remained comfortably within 
legislature's authority to police the health, morals, and welfare of the 
state's citizens. 76 Had the legislature prohibited the sale only of intox-
icating liquors imported or manufactured after the statute took effect, 
and not applied the law to "property innocently acquired under exist-
71 [d. at 1124. 
72 I d. at I I 2 I. 
73 Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 383 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6). 
74 I d. at 385-86. 
75 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coli. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Dash v. Van 
Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811). Shugerman similarly claims that newly elected judges relied on 
"substantive due process" to limit New York's Married Women's Property Act of 1848. Shuger-
man, supra noteII, at II25. Like in Wynehamer, however, in that case the New York Court of 
Appeals merely held that a husband held a vested right under the state Due Process Clause in a 
legacy bequeathed to his wife by her father before the 1848 Act took effect. See Westervelt v. 
Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854). 
76 As Judge Comstock assured his readers, the court's decision was "not intended to narrow 
the field of legislature discretion in regulating and controlling the traffic in intoxicating liquors. 
We only say that, in all such legislation, the essential right of the citizen to his property must be 
preserved." Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 405. Indeed, Judge Comstock quotes Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 386 (1798), at length to emphasize the ex post facto nature of the constitutional infirmity: 
"The legislature cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or violate the 
right of antecedent lawful private contract, or the right of private property." Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. 
at 391 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (emphasis added» (internal quotation mark omit-
ted). 
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ing laws,"77 Judge Comstock suggested, the regulation would have 
survived constitutional review. 
I do not mean to suggest that Judge Comstock's robust, high-
profile defense of private property rights is unrelated to the "substan-
tive due process" decisions of the Lochner era. Indeed, the New York 
Court of Appeals later relied on Wynehamer in In re Jacobs 78 for the 
important proposition that "[ w ]hen a law annihilates the value of 
property," the owner is deprived of his property within the meaning of 
the constitutional right to due process of law. 79 However, while Wyne-
hamer furnished helpful precedent for the police powers jurisprudence 
of the Lochner era, it remains a far cry from later prototypical "subs-
tantive due process" opinions, including Justice Field's dissent in the 
Slaughter-House Cases,80 high-profile state court decisions such as Ja-
cobs and Godcharles v. Wigeman,81 as well as Lochner itself. As I ex-
plain below, such decisions are distinctive not for their protection of 
vested property rights, but rather for their constitutionalization of the 
economic liberty to pursue one's avocation and sell one's labor. 
III. IN SEARCH OF "LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM" 
This Part attempts to reground the Lochner era's iconic, if unrepre-
sentative, police powers jurisprudence within its immediate historical 
context in order to explain why the Jacksonian vocabulary of class in-
terest and special privilege resonated with courts in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. It 
suggests that by overstating the role of mid-century vested rights deci-
sions, Shugerman's account obscures subsequent, more immediate his-
torical "causes" of laissez-faire constitutionalism. If we are to draw a 
line of historical causation between Wynehamer and the substantive 
due process of the Lochner era, it must necessarily run through the wa-
tershed historical events of slave emancipation and the emergence of 
an industrial proletariat, and the transformative constitutional changes 
ushered in by the Reconstruction Amendments. To the extent that 
Lochner-era courts did selectively constitutionalize economic liberty, 
postbellum doctrinal innovations by jurists such as Justice Stephen 
Field and Thomas Cooley are indispensable to the origins story that 
Shugerman proposes to tell. 
77 I d. at 385-86. 
78 98 N.Y. 98 (r885) (striking down a state law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tene-
ment houses as an unconstitutional deprivation of economic liberty and property). 
79 [d. at r06 (quoting Wynehamer, r3 N.Y. at 398) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
80 83 U.S. (r6 Wall.) 36, 83-IIr (r873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
81 6 A. 354 (Pa. r886) (striking down a state law providing that laborers in iron mills be paid 
in U.S. currency as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of contract). 
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Justice Field's seminal dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House 
Cases 82 is essential to any account of the origins of the Lochner era. 
With three co-dissenters, Justice Field insisted that the Louisiana legis-
lature, by chartering a slaughterhouse and granting it a twenty-five-
year butchering monopoly, had deprived New Orleans butchers ex-
cluded from the monopoly of their privileges and immunities as citi-
zens of the United States, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 
Of what, exactly, did those privileges and immunities consist? Justice 
Field's answer provided an indispensible precedent for the constitutio-
nalization of economic liberty during the last third of the nineteenth 
century. He wrote: 
This equality of right ... in the lawful pursuits of life ... is the distin-
guishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, everywhere, 
all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restric-
tions than such as are imposed equally upon all others .... This is the 
fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless adhered to 
in the legislation of the country our government will be a republic only in 
name. The fourteenth amendment ... makes it essential ... that this 
equality of right should be respected .... And it is to me a matter of pro-
found regret that [the] validity [of the butchering monopoly] is recognized 
by a majority of this court, for by it the right of free labor, one of the most 
sacred and imprescriptible rights of man, is violated.84 
Justice Field's rendering of constitutional economic liberty chan-
neled a generation of republican "free labor" ideology into a constitu-
tional injunction against state abridgment of the "equality of right 
among citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life."85 At 
the heart of the "free labor" ideal was the figure of the self-employed 
farmer or skilled artisan. In republican political theory, a man's own-
ership of productive property, and his "independence" in the pursuit of 
his economic calling, had long guaranteed both his economic self-
sufficiency and his virtuous, independent citizenship.86 To labor for a 
wage, by contrast, was to forfeit one's independence - to subject 
one's personal autonomy, and even political will, to the authority of an 
82 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at 83-II1 (Field, J., dissenting). My analysis draws from William For-
bath's important article, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 
supra note 7, at 773-79. 
83 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at lIO (Field, J., dissenting). 
84 [d. at I09-IO. 
85 [d. at I09. 
86 See generally DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY 25-44 (I967); Forbath, supra 
note 7, at 774-77. 
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employer.87 In the post-Civil War period, the republican vision fell in-
to jeopardy as never before as the industrial revolution transformed 
small farmers and skilled craftsmen into propertyless wage earners, 
and as immigrants from Europe and China joined the ranks of the na-
tion's growing army of industrial hirelings. "The butchers whose 
rights Justice Field championed in the Slaughter-House Cases," ex-
plains historian William Forbath, stood as exemplars of the old free 
labor ideal: They were self-employed petty entrepreneurs struggling 
against a state-imposed monopoly that threatened to subject them to 
the control of the new corporation, depriving them of their indepen-
dence and reducing them to the condition of wage laborers.88 
If Justice Field's opinion championed the butchers' republican in-
dependence, however, it also laid the constitutional groundwork for a 
very different and, in the postbellum period, ascendant conception of 
economic liberty. Immediately following the passage quoted above 
trumpeting the republican virtues of free labor, Justice Field inserted a 
long footnote quoting at length Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: 
"The property which every man has in his own labor," says Adam Smith, 
"as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sa-
cred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength 
and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing his 
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to 
his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a man-
ifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those 
who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from work-
ing at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the other from employing 
whom they think proper."89 
If this was an expression of economic liberty lifted directly from 
one of the seminal texts of classical liberal political economy, it was al-
so a vision that resonated deeply with the great moral and political 
cause of the previous generation - the abolition of slavery. Abolition-
ists had celebrated the voluntary sale of one's labor as the antithesis of 
slavery, and the right to dispose of one's labor at market price had 
taken on the moral and emotional weight of opposing human bondage. 
Slave emancipation and the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,90 
securing the right to contract for the sale of one's labor as an essential 
87 See generally LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE 22-24 (I997); MONTGOMERY, 
supra note 86, at 30-33; AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 9-IO (I998); 
Forbath, supra note 7, at 774-75. 
88 Forbath, supra note 7, at 776. 
89 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at IrO n* (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM 
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 225 (Penguin Classics 1986) (I776)). 
90 Ch. 3I, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.). 
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right of citizenship, enshrined this vision into law. 91 Most importantly, 
by extolling workers' "sacred property" in their own labor and their 
"liberty" to dispose of that property as they thought proper, Smith, and 
Justice Field, offered a vision of economic liberty adapted not to a re-
public of independent artisans and craftsmen, but to the propertyless 
hirelings who populated the swelling industrial labor force. It was the 
liberal, Smithian, abolitionist, and distinctly industrial-era conception 
of economic liberty that occasionally found its way into late-
nineteenth-century judicial opinions. 
Whether we read Justice Field's dissent as a conservative defense 
of the waning republican free labor ideal or the handmaiden of an 
emergent industrial-era political economy, the intellectual and juris-
prudential legacy of the opinion lies in its radical redefinition of "liber-
ty" and "property." In this project, Justice Field was joined by the jur-
ist and treatise writer Thomas Cooley, whose influential Treatise on 
Constitutional Limitations, first published in r 868, argued that the 
state due process clauses placed significant substantive limits on the 
authority of legislatures to regulate common law property rights. 92 For 
Cooley and for Justice Field, "property" could encompass not only land 
and tangible goods, but anything with market value; "liberty" meant 
not only physical freedom, but freedom to act in the marketplace, and 
particularly to sell one's labor.93 After Slaughter-House, Forbath 
notes, those who felt unjustly burdened by a particular economic regu-
lation "could proceed to court with Field's sacred banner of Free La-
bor in one hand and Cooley's Treatise in the other."94 
When litigants did exactly that, they were received warmly by state 
high courts on at least a few occasions. Indeed, the handful of opi-
nions from the r880s striking down state labor regulations read like 
tributes to Justice Field and Cooley. The New York Court of Appeals' 
91 See generally STANLEY, supra note 87, at I-59; Forbath, supra note 7, at 782-86. In deter-
mining what, exactly, were the privileges and immunities that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tected from state abridgement, Justice Field turned first to the recently enacted Civil Rights Act 
of 1866. Although passed before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Field ex-
plained, the Civil Rights Act expressed Congress' interpretation of the term "privileges and im-
munities" as it was used in section I. It includes, Justice Field wrote, quoting directly from the 
Act, the right "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § I, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (cod-
ified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1981» (internal quotation marks omitted). Among such rights, 
Justice Field continued, "must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful 
manner, without other restraint than such as equally effects all persons." I d. at 97. 
92 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 351-61 
(5th ed. 1883). 
93 See Benedict, supra note 6; Forbath, supra note 7, at 792-94. 
94 Forbath, supra note 7, at 794. 
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opinion in In re Jacobs, which invalidated a law prohibiting the manu-
facture of cigars in tenement houses, exemplifies the new property and 
liberty: "The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived 
of his property without due process of law may be violated without the 
physical taking of property .... "95 Any law that "destroys it or its 
value, or takes away any of its essential attributes," would deprive a 
person of his property. 96 So, too, could a person be unconstitutionally 
deprived of his liberty "without the actual imprisonment or restraint of 
his person."97 "Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this coun-
try," the court continued, "means the right, not only of freedom from 
actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use 
his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn 
his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or 
avocation."98 Laws that "limit one in his choice of a trade or profes-
sion, or confine him to work or live in a specified locality,"99 are there-
fore "infringements upon his fundamental rights of liberty."lOo 
If the term "substantive due process" means anything, then, it is 
that the state, and later federal, due process clauses protect both a 
man's property right in his avocation - whether the means of con-
ducting his trade or the sale of his labor - and his liberty to pursue it. 
If the statute at issue in Wynehamer had been reviewed through this 
distinctly late-nineteenth-century constitutional lens, the analysis may 
have looked quite different. At issue would have been not only Wyne-
hamer's "vested" right to dispose of the liquor he already had in his 
warehouse, but also his constitutional liberty to engage in his avoca-
95 In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, lO5 (r885). 
96 Id. 
97 I d. at lO6. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 I d. at r07. Two years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania echoed the Jacobs court's 
conception of economic liberty. In Godcharles v. Wigeman, the court struck down a state law re-
quiring that iron workers be paid in cash at regular intervals, rather than in company "script," as 
an unconstitutional attempt to 
prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts. The act is an in-
fringement alike of the rights of the employer and the employe. More than this, it is an 
insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only de-
grading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States. 
He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his em-
ployer may sell his iron or coal; and any and every law that proposes to prevent him 
from so doing so is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vi-
cious and void. 
6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. r886). See also State v. Goodwill, lO S.E. 285 (W. Va. r889) (striking down a 
law forbidding payment in company script on the ground that it interfered with the "liberty" of 
every man "to pursue any lawful trade or avocation," id. at 286 (quoting People v. Gillson, 17 
N.E. 345 (N.Y. r888» (internal quotation mark omitted), and the "property which every man has 
in his own labor," id. at 287). 
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tion of selling liquor, including liquor that he might acquire in the 
future. 
B. "Class Legislation" in the Industrial Era 
As I suggest above,101 there is today broad recognition among his-
torians and legal scholars that Lochner-era courts little resembled the 
hyper-vigilant guardians of the private market and individual econom-
ic liberty long imagined by the "progressive" critics of "laissez-faire 
constitutionalism." State and federal judges did not oppose govern-
ment interference in the market per se, but rather those forms of inter-
ference that they interpreted as "class" legislation, serving the narrow 
interests of a particular social or economic group over those of the 
general public. A generation of legal historians has produced a size-
able and fascinating literature tracing Lochner-era scrutiny of such 
class legislation to the Jacksonian opposition to special legislative priv-
ileges. In particular, a series of intellectual-biographical studies of 
leading icons of laissez-faire constitutionalism persuasively present jur-
ists such as Justice Stephen Field and Thomas Cooley not as laissez-
faire ideologues, but rather as principled neo-Jacksonians, committed 
to the defense of the general good against the corrupting influence of 
powerful economic interests.102 Even though I have taken issue with 
Shugerman's characterization of this Jacksonian impulse as a variety 
of "laissez faire," his contention that Lochner-era police powers juris-
prudence was built on Jacksonian foundations enjoys abundant sup-
port in the existing literature. 
As historians and legal scholars continue to excavate evidence 
of the Lochner era's rich ancestry, however, we should not lose sight of 
why the Jacksonian vocabulary of class interest and special privilege 
resonated with American courts in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century and first decades of the twentieth - in other words, why the 
Lochner-era happened when it did. Notwithstanding the splendid, 
multivalent complexity of its intellectual origins, "laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism" was in fact deeply imbedded in its immediate historical con-
text - a context characterized, above all, by the industrial reorganiza-
tion of labor, the consequent escalation of class conflict, and the 
emergence of a host of reform initiatives directed toward redressing 
101 See sources cited supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g., Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Recon-
sideration, 53 J. AM. RIST. 751 (1967); McCurdy, supra note 6. But see Manuel Cachan, Justice 
Stephen Field and "Free Soil, Free Labor Constitutionalism": Reconsidering Revisionism, 20 
LAW & RIST. REV. 541 (2002) (challenging Justice Field's Jacksonian bona fides and arguing that 
by the Gilded Age, free labor ideology had absorbed elements of laissez-faire ideology). 
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industrial inequality. As Professor Howard Gillman explains, during 
the last third of the nineteenth century, 
changes were occurring in the structure of capitalist social relations that 
led increasing numbers of people to question whether their well-being 
could be protected by a formally neutral polity. These changes triggered a 
proliferation of group and class activity as powerful interests began de-
manding special favors from government and vulnerable groups began 
demanding special protection from the coercive effects of a corporate in-
dustrial economy. These demands constituted a direct challenge to an es-
tablished tenet of political legitimacy, and the legal community - state 
courts and legal commentators - responded accordingly in repeated con-
demnations of illegitimate "class" politics. 103 
The critical duty of Lochner-era courts, as the guardians of state 
neutrality, was thus to distinguish between the vast majority of police 
regulations that were legitimately directed toward the public health 
and welfare and the illegitimate minority that were calculated to serve 
the interests of a narrow class. 
In one respect, then, Lochner-era resistance to legislation that ap-
peared to promote narrow class interests rather than the general wel-
fare simply continued the judiciary's traditional commitment to the 
principle of state neutrality. But the complexion of that resistance -
especially the kinds of legislation that courts interpreted as "class" leg-
islation - was also fundamentally a product of the class conflict and 
economic inequality that accompanied the industrialization of 
the northern economy. Indeed, the police regulations that attracted the 
most aggressive judicial scrutiny tended to be statutes that sought to 
restore to wage laborers some measure of bargaining power relative 
to their employers l04 - the signature reforms of the industrial era. 
Lochner itself is a prime example. It was precisely the majority's 
recognition of a newly minted constitutional right of property in and 
liberty to dispose of one's labor that triggered the Court's scrutiny of 
the challenged regulation. lo5 Echoing the conception of constitutional 
103 GILLMAN, supra note 6, at l4 (footnote omitted). As Professor Owen Fiss pointedly ob-
serves, "[t]he activism of Melville Fuller ... was a method of resistance, a way of coping with new 
forms of social and political organization and activity." FISS, supra note 8, at 20. Other leading 
scholars likewise characterize Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence as a reaction to legislative 
efforts to address the era's accelerating economic inequality. As Professor Morton Horwitz ex-
plains, "the inherently redistributive potential of the police power emerged with a vengeance" in 
response to "the reality of an increasingly unequal society," thus dissolving "the relatively fixed 
common law categories on which police power doctrines had been erected" and blurring the tradi-
tional "distinction between the health of a worker and the conditions of industrial life." MOR-
TON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, l870-l960, at 30 (l992). 
104 See Forbath, supra note 64, at 649; Orren, supra note 34 at 533. 
105 In this I differ with some among the current generation of revisionist historians, whose in-
sistence that "laissez-faire constitutionalism" was animated by Jacksonian principles of state neu-
trality rather than by laissez-faire economic ideology or naked class interest has minimized, al-
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economic liberty set forth in Justice Field's Slaughter-House dissent-
a conception, as I noted above, that was inseparable from both aboli-
tionism and the industrial transformation of labor - the majority con-
cluded with little difficulty that the "right to make a contract in rela-
tion to [one's] business," and particularly the "right to purchase or to 
sell labor," was "part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."106 
With the constitutional stakes thus clarified, the Court turned to 
whether the regulation was a "reasonable and appropriate exercise of 
the police power of the State," or instead "an unreasonable, unneces-
sary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his 
personalliberty."107 The Court "dismissed in a few words" any sugges-
tion that legislation enacted to benefit workers qua workers implicated 
the general welfare. "Viewed in the light of a purely labor law," it con-
cluded, "the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree af-
fected .... "108 The Court likewise denied that a law regulating the 
hours of labor worked by bakers might lie within the state's police au-
thority as a "health law." The state's contention that the purpose of 
the act was to protect the public health was so utterly unpersuasive, 
the majority maintained, that it was "impossible for [the Court] to shut 
[its] eyes" to the legislature's "other motives."109 "[T]he real object and 
purpose" of the act, the majority charged, "were simply to regulate the 
hours of labor between the master and his employes."110 
In thus concluding that a law altering the existing balance of bar-
gaining power between employers and workers could not reasonably 
be interpreted as serving the general welfare, the Court plunged head-
first into the consuming social and political issue of the day - the so-
called "labor problem." Even as the venerable Jacksonian value of 
state neutrality guided the Court's scrutiny of New York's "labor law," 
the majority's basic justification for that scrutiny - the reason, by its 
own insistence, that it was compelled to scrutinize this interference 
with the purchase and sale of labor - lay not in the anti-class-
legislation principles of the Jacksonians, or the vested rights precedents 
of the r850s, but rather in an emergent conception of workers' liberty 
most to the point of invisibility, the role played by the constitutionalization of economic liberty in 
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. Under this view, the Lochner Court upheld "liberty of 
contract" against legislative encroachment not as a positive constitutional right that imposed an 
"external" constraint on the authority of the state, but rather as a residuum of freedom that "re-
mained to the individual after the state reached the outer bounds of its authority." Frss, supra 
note 8, at I59. 
106 Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45, 53 (I905). 
107 Id.at56. 
108 Id. at 57. 
109 I d. at 64. 
110 Id. 
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to dispose of their labor that was rooted in the anti-slavery movement 
and the neoclassical political economy of the industrial era. 111 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Jed Shugerman's article offers an enlightening account of how the 
first generation of elected state judges transformed the Jacksonian an-
tagonism toward "class" legislation into a countermajoritarian ratio-
nale for robust judicial review, characterized by an enhanced protec-
tion of individual rights and an anti-populist conception of majority 
rule as a "threat to higher law." This Response challenges Shuger-
man's further suggestion, however, that the expansion of judicial re-
view in the r850s, sometimes in the service of "vested" property rights, 
helped to effect a "transition from the early republic's active industry-
building state to the laissez-faire constitutionalism that dominated the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century."112 
The challenge rests on two related grounds. First, despite the per-
sistence of "progressive" mythology, the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries were hardly "dominated" by an approach to constitu-
tional review that can fairly be characterized as "laissez-faire." Despite 
a handful of now-notorious decisions striking down police regulations 
in a manner that, in hindsight, can appear almost ostentatious, state 
and federal courts upheld the vast majority of Lochner-era economic 
legislation. Second, Shugerman overemphasizes the mid-century ori-
gins of "laissez-faire constitutionalism" at the expense of the watershed 
historical events that transformed American constitutional culture dur-
ing the last third of the nineteenth century. These historical develop-
ments provide the immediate context for, and give essential meaning 
to, the era's iconic (if unrepresentative) police power jurisprudence. 
To the extent that Lochner-era courts did constitutionalize economic 
liberty (and they did, albeit highly selectively), they were inspired less 
by the vested rights jurisprudence that preceded the Civil War than by 
the constitutional and industrial revolutions that followed it. Shuger-
man's account both overdetermines the historical meaning of the mid-
century decisions and correspondingly casts Lochner-era courts as his-
111 The frequent observation that the Lochner Court measured the neutrality of police regula-
tions against a "common law baseline" may likewise dehistoricize the constitutionalization of eco-
nomic liberty. As Sunstein writes of Lochner, "Market ordering under the common law was un-
derstood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it formed the baseline from 
which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that distinguished ... neutrality from imper-
missible partisanship." Sunstein, supra note 5 at 874. While I agree that the Court's conception 
of state neutrality was informed by its presumption of a "common law baseline," that fact, with-
out more, does not account for why the Court constitutionalized certain forms of economic liberty 
when it did. 
112 Shugerman, supra note II, at r068. 
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torically decontextualized receptacles of decades-old precedent. The 
result is an account of the origins of the Lochner era that tells us little 
about why, exactly, the Lochner era happened when it did. 
